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1. Introduction 
The action plan to reduce hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico and the large number of 
lawsuits related to the Total Maximum Daily Loads regulation illustrate the heightened 
concerns over water quality issues, both at a local and regional level.  Non-point sources, 
in particular agricultural ones, are a significant source of pollutants.  This explains in part 
the increased availability of conservation funds for agriculture in the last decade.  The 
latest Farm Bill in particular, through the Conservation Security Program (CSP), has 
introduced several innovations in conservation policy, including payments for adopting 
conservation practices on land in prodiction and watershed-level targeting.    
The institution of watershed-level targeting presents interesting policy design 
questions because environmental watershed-level benefits from conservation practices 
have not, so far, been the subject of many study.  As far as we are aware, there is no study 
that incorporates the analysis of both the environmental benefits and the economic costs. 
Such an analysis requires extensive micro-level data, river basin scale models, and a 
simultaneous economic and hydrologic analysis.   
The institution of watershed-based conservation also means that edge-of-field benefit 
analysis, which has been the standard so far, does not provide adequate information to 
assess the effectiveness of policy.  The impact of conservation practices on water quality, 
as measured at an outlet, is typically not simply the sum of the reduction of sediment at 
the edge of each field.  This also implies that water quality benefits from adopting a 
conservation practice downstream may be dependent on the level of conservation practice 
adoption upstream.  More in general, the water quality benefits will depend on the 
hydrology of the watershed at hand.   
Clerly, the point at which the water quality benefits are measured is likely to be very 
important.  For example, in a large watershed, assessing benefits only at the main outlet 
may give disproportionate representation to the lower part of the watershed.  Assessing 
benefits at several points may be more representative of the water quality impact of the 
policy, but it may mean a substantial increase in expenditure (most monitoring data 
would have to be daily, and include the measurement of several pollutants).  Furthermore, 
historical data with which to compare the ex post measurement are limited.     3 
The goal of the current analysis is two-fold.  First, we discuss what watershed-based 
conservation policy effectively mean when assessing policy performance.  In particular, 
we focus on the parallel between watershed-based conservation policy and ambient-based 
pollution control.   
Secondly, we analyze the issue of targeting within a watershed and its link to the 
point of measurement, or the outlet at which water quality assessments are made.   
We start by developing a theoretical model that illustrates the mechanisms of the 
discharge and loadings of a pollutant at the watershed level, using sediment as an 
example, and the role of conservation practices in reducting discharge.  We focus on 
conservation budgets for adopting conservation tillage, one of the most common best 
management practices available to farmers in the Midwest and one of the practices 
included in the CSP.  We then develop an empirical analysis of the issue by focusing on 
the conservation practice of reduced tillage.  To do so, we link a tillage adoption model 
based on the National Resource Inventory (NRI) data (Nusser and goebel, 1997) to the 
Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model.  The SWAT model is a watershed-level 
water quality model that calculates loading and concentrations of sediment and nutrients 
at the overall watershed outlet and for each subwatershed within the area of analysis.  We 
can therefore examine the effectiveness of various configurations and targeting policies 
aimed at reducing sediment loads in the water at the watershed and subwatershed level 
through the adoption of conservation tillage.  This allows us to determine empirically the 
extent to which non-linearities are present in the system and across watersheds and what 
are the efficiency losses from ignoring these non-linearities.   
We apply our analysis to the Des Moines River watershed, a large, mostly 
agricultural, watershed in Iowa and Minnesota that drains into the Mississippi river, and 
is therefore a contributor to the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico (CENR, 2000).  The 
scale of the water quality degradation problem in the area is demonstrated by the 
inclusion of 43 stream segments and lakes within the watershed on the current U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) listing of impaired waterways.  In this paper, 
we focus on sediment reduction.  High sediment loads are a water quality problem 
because sediment can fill reservoirs and cause channel siltation, thereby raising the costs 
of water treatment and channel dredging.  Moreover, high levels of sediment can have a   4 
negative impact on fish and wildlife, greatly reducing the economic and recreational 
value of streams and lakes. 
We use the 1997 levels of conservation tillage adoption as our baseline, and examine 
three policy scenarios.  In the first, we assume that conservation funds are allocated 
exclusively either upstream or downstream in the watershed, and in the second, we 
assume funds are targeted to the sub-watersheds with the highest initial sediment loads.  
Finally, we study various levels of conservation tillage payments not spatially targeted.  
This is a policy payment scheme after those discussed in the proposed CSP 
implementation rules (USDA/NRCS, 2004).  Specifically, we consider the schemes under 
which farmers are offered the maximums of $10, $20, or $30 per acre for adopting 
conservation tillage.  In each case, we use the econometrically fit tillage adoption model 
to predict which acreage will convert to conservation tillage under subsidy payments. The 
SWAT model is then used to estimate the changes in sediment loading resulting from the 
policy.  
The study provides a numerical evaluation of ambient-based pollution reduction, and 
how the optimal allocation of funds across the landscape may be affected be the level of 
funds available.  The quantification of the effects is also expected to contribute to the 
discussions of pollutant trading involving non-point sources. While the trading idea is 
being actively pursued by regulators, because of cumulative watershed effects, there is 
substantial uncertainty over the permit-to-emission ratios to use.  This study will help 
identify the permit-to-emission ratios.  
 
2. The Theoretical Model 
The model developed below is discussed in terms of sediment loads.  However, 
the model could also be applied to other pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorous, or 
bacteria.  In all these cases, non-linearities are allowed to be present.  Our analysis could 
also be extended to a combination of pollutants.  In that case, it would be necessary to 
specify weights for the relative importance of each pollutant to create an index
1. We 
simplify by abstracting from the impact of flow on sediment discharge and delivery, and 
                                                 
1 This would be similar to the construction of the Environmental Benefit Index that is used to enroll land in 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).   5 
concentrate on the processes going on across watersheds rather than within each 
watershed. 
We consider a river which contains I watersheds. We order the watersheds from 
upstream to downstream (note that this will not necessarily be a line): 1, 2, 3…I, and use 
the subscript ui to denote the quantities associated with the watersheds upstream of 
watershed i. Define i q  as the amount of sediment in the water at the outlet of watershed i. 
We define i d  as the amount of sediment discharged in the water in watershed i.  Thus, 
1 1 q d =  and  1 2 3 1 ( ) ( , , ... ) i ui i I I I q f d d q f d d d d d - = + ⇒ = + .  The sediment discharged in 
the watershed i can be affected by a scalar conservation effort i e . The amount of sediment 









.   i c .  Then  ( ) where  ' 0 i i d g e g = £ .  Therefore  ( ) ( ) i ui ui i i q f d e d e = +     . 
Finally, we define a conservation policy as a collection of conservation 
efforts { } 1 2 , ,..., I e e e e = .  The water quality benefits of the policy can be defined in 
several ways.  First, they could be the sum of the reduction in sediment discharge at each 
outlet. 
Definition Emission-based evaluation of water quality benefits of a policye at the 
j -th watershed outlet, ( )
emission
j b e , is defined as the sum of the discharge reductions at the 
watershed  j and all the watersheds upstream of it. That is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0
emission
j k k k j j j
uj
b e q q e q q e
 
º - + -  
  ∑ . 
Definition Ambient-based evaluation of water quality benefits of a policy e at the 
j-th watershed outlet, ( ) j b e , are defined as the difference between the sediment in the 
water in the absence of the policy and the sediment in the water in the presence of the 
policy, at the j-th watershed outlet. That is,  
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 j j j b e q q e º -  
   6 
Thus, the emission-based accounting of water quality benefits would double-
count benefits and therefore tend to overestimate impacts compared with the ambient-
based accounting of water quality benefits.  
Note that the benefits could also be defined in terms of the level of conservation 










º - ∑ .  Most of the current policies are practice-based, and 
so are concerned primarily with the effort level rather than its effectiveness in reducing 
pollution. 
The shown difference in the emission-based and the ambient-based evaluation of 
benefits has important implications for targeting conservation policy. A policy that is 
designed to minimize the discharges from the watersheds comprising the river basin 
would not, in general, minimize the amount of sediment at the bottom of the basin. In the 
empirical application below we demonstrate this difference.  




c e ∑ , are 
additive across the watersheds, the benefits generally are not.  Note that additive costs 
across space are not necessarily linear in the level of adoption of conservation practice, 
since the marginal cost of enrolling land in the program depends on the cost of giving up 
conventional tillage for the marginal parcel of land, which itself is a function of land 
characteristics and profitability.   
As we noted, the system is non-linear at the spatial level.  Clearly, these non-
linearities have implications for an efficient allocation of conservation funds across the 
landscape.  For example, in general, the gains from conservation practices at the outlet 
for a given level of conservation practices will be higher if the practices are adopted near 
the outlet, because part of the sediment from upstream gets deposited, and this decreases 
the downstream gains from reducing the sediment.  However, since the cost of adoption 
is not spatially homogeneous, if enrolling land upstream is cheaper than enrolling land 
downstream, it may not make sense from an economic standpoint to limit payments to the 
downstream portions of the watershed.  The determination of the efficient allocation of 
funds is an empirical issue that has to take into account the hydrology of the watershed.   7 
As the empirical results below demonstrate, however, optimal targeting would 
have to take into account – indirectly, through their effects on the marginal cost-benefit 
curves, other watershed characteristics as well.  For example, if funding is limited to 
certain sub-watersheds, as the latest CSP rule (USDA/NRCS, 2004) suggests, the level of 
forest and pasture in those watersheds may put a ceiling to the potential gains from 
conservation. 
 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical model has to main components: the conservation tillage adoption 
model and the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model.  The economic model 
presented in detail in Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2003) is used to predict the level of 
subsidy required for adoption of conservation tillage at every crop production point in 
NRI database in Iowa.  
The SWAT model is a conceptual, physically based long-term continuous watershed 
scale simulation model that operates on a daily time step.  Flow generation, sediment 
yield, and non-point-source loadings from each sub-watershed are routed through 
channels, ponds, and/or reservoirs to the watershed outlet (Arnold et al. 1998).  The 
model is capable of simulating a high level of spatial detail by allowing the division of a 
watershed into a large number of subwatersheds.  In this study, the subwatersheds 
correspond to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Hydrologic Cataloging Units that are 
commonly referred to as “8-digit” watersheds (see Fig. 1).  This is the same level of 
analysis of the Hydrologic Unit Model for the United States (HUMUS) modeling 
framework (Arnold et al. 1999). 
Within each subbasin there are subwatersheds with unique combinations of soils 
and land-uses, called hydrologic response units (HRU).  HRUs are virtual units of 
analysis.  We know in which subbasin they are, but we do not know where they are 
located within that subbasin.  The NRI database is the basis for the construction of the 
HRUs.  NRI points are aggregated on the basis of soil characteristics, crop and rotation, 
and tillage practice as predicted from the tillage adoption model. 
Figure 1 – The structure of the Des Moines River watershed.    8 
 
The Des Moines River is in darker blue, its major tributaries in lighter blue.  The tree to the right shows the 
hydrological structure of the watershed. 
 
The integrated models are used to examine policy scenarios, where conservation 
funds are allocated spatially.  Specifically, we divide the watershed in three areas, up-, 
mid- and downstream (Fig. 2).  This allows us to examine spatial targeting issues without 
having to consider a very large number of alternative targeting policies.  The second 
scenario focuses on targeting the worst watersheds in terms of the highest loads per 
hectares.  The final scenario examined concentrates on various levels of conservation 
tillage payments not spatially targeted: any producer in the watershed can participate.  
Specifically, we look at payment levels of $10, $20, and $30 per acre.  Throughout the 
analysis we assume an existence of a true-cost-revealing mechanism that allows the 
policymaker enroll the producers in the program by paying them exactly the minimum 
per acre subsidy needed. 
 
 
Figure 2 – The division of the Des Moines River watershed.    9 
 
Results 
We start by presenting some of the characteristics of the watersheds at the 
baseline, that is, with the level of conservation tillage and the lend uses prevalent in 1997, 
and in the absence of a conservation tillage subsidy.  The watershed is divided in nine 
sub-basins of varying areas (Table 1). The area of the upstream watersheds sums up to 
about 25% of the total, and that of the midstream ones at 44%, so that 31% is left to 
downstream sub-basins.  The number of HRUs in which each of the subbasin is divided 
at the baseline ranges from 82 to 215.  In general, there is one HRU for land in CRP, one 
each for pasture, forest and “other” land, a residual category that includes urban land.  All 
the other HRUs are devoted to cropland. 
Table 2 shows the land use by sub-basin.  In the whole watershed, about 68% of 
the watershed is cropped (excluding CRP – the CRP total area is about 4.66% of the total 
watershed area).  However, there are substantial differences among the sub-watersheds.  
The northern watersheds are more heavily cropped, and, correspondingly, have less land 
in CRP, forest and pasture.  This reflects the fact that the land in the northern part of the   10 
watershed is more productive.  In the South, the less productive land is used for pasture 
based livestock production or is left not cropped, as forest. 
   
Table 1. The sub-basins’. 
Reach  Reach area as  
% watershed area 
# of HRU  
in the baseline 
1  8.538  191 
2  7.636  138 
3  9.216  128 
4  12.042  131 
5  6.774  82 
6  16.911  154 
7  7.930  167 
8  16.783  215 
9  14.171  158 
Total    1364 
   
Table 2. The sub-basins’ land uses. 
Reach  Land uses as 
% of each 
reach area  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Cropland   77.69  79.65  89.46  77.39  91.29  81.77  64.72  47.06  30.24 
CRP  4.96  5.25  1.46  1.41  0.75  1.04  6.75  7.70  10.45 
Other   8.57  8.75  5.92  10.46  6.18  9.16  9.97  13.77  15.64 
Forest  1.42  1.93  0.57  5.78  0.54  1.48  4.66  9.31  21.54 
Pasture  7.36  4.42  2.60  4.97  1.25  6.55  13.90  22.15  22.13 
 
The great majority of the agricultural land, over 80%, is in corn soybean rotations.  
The second rotation in terms of acreage, at less than 8% of the cropped area, is corn-corn-
soybean.  Corn followed by alfalfa accounts for a little over 5% of agricultural land, and 
soybean-soybean-corn for about 4%.  Across the watersheds there are some differences, 
as illustrated by Table 3. The higher level of corn-alfalfa in the Southern portion of the 
watershed is another consequence of the presence of less fertile land and of the higher 
level of pasture-based livestock production. 
The baseline levels of adoption of conservation tillage by sub-watershed are 
provided in Table 4.  Overall adoption for the watershed is 46%. Historically, there is a 
certain degree of fluctuation in the levels of adoption of conservation tillage.  The   11 
geographical heterogeneity of adoption in the watershed reflects historical differences 
and dissimilarities in land characteristics.   
 
Table 3. Percent of agricultural area by rotation 
Rotation  Reach 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
CC  0.00  2.19  3.35  2.12  1.42  0.68  3.58  2.67  1.36 
SS  1.19  0.63  0.48  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  2.33 
CS  81.55  80.44  82.77  86.42  87.75  87.15  78.05  67.82  54.22 
CCS  5.40  7.43  11.31  6.32  7.77  5.66  6.68  10.35  13.21 
SSC  6.30  6.67  0.96  3.68  2.01  3.54  2.08  7.28  6.08 
CA  5.55  2.64  1.13  1.45  1.05  2.97  9.62  10.95  22.80 
Notation: C- corn, S – soybeans, A – alfalfa.  
 
The SWAT model is calibrated for the first 10 years of the simulation and 
validated using the second decade of data.  Figure 3 shows the model’s predictions 
together with the measured data for flow (monthly data), while Figure 4 has the same 
information for sediment loads.  In the case of flow, the R
2 for the first decade is 0.6687, 
for the second it is 0.7608.  For sediment, the R
2 for the first decade is 0.6687, for the 
second it is 0.7608. 
 
Table 4 – Baseline levels of adoption of conservation tillage by watershed 
Reach  % cropland 
 in conservation tillage 
 in the baseline (1997) 
1  38.33 
2  41.88 
3  43.39 
4  58.49 
5  43.33 
6  47.64 
7  39.07 
8  49.80 
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Table 5 reports what happens to the sediment loads at each watershed’s outlet at 
the baseline (BL), and when the upper, middle, and lower part of the Des Moines 
watershed are completely converted into conservation tillage (UC, MC, and DC 
respectively).  The last column illustrates what happens when the entire watershed is 
cropped using conservation tillage.  The table shows that conservation tillage upstream 
greatly reduces the sediment loads at the outlets of reach 1, 2 and 3.  A great part of that 


































































Measured Predicted  13 
almost no effect further down, at the outlet 8 and then 9.  The reason is that two large 
dams, Saylorville and Red Rock, act as barriers and effectively create isolated 
watersheds.  According to the Army Core of Engineers, “Both Saylorville and Red Rock 
are effective sediment traps, often capturing more 80 to 99% of the suspended solids 
load” (p.114, Lutz and Cummings).   
 
Table 5 – Sediment loads in case of total conversion to CT by watershed (metric 
tons/year) and associated costs 
 
Reach  BL UC MC DC AC
1  195,358 114,298 195,358 195,358 114,219
2  590,683 339,331 590,683 590,683 339,104
3  545,711 314,754 545,711 545,711 314,563
4  2,200,478 1,729,067 1,850,406 2,200,478 1,377,617
5  311,848 311,848 170,273 311,848 170,172
6  873,144 873,144 589,756 873,144 589,283
7  997,356 997,356 649,778 997,356 649,367
8  3,678,722 3,647,833 3,380,067 3,315,117 2,926,539
9  3,556,283 3,562,622 3,559,156 3,335,722 3,280,956
Cost  $ 0 $30,741,300 $41,736,360 $10,009,310 $82,487,000
 
Figure 5 illustrates the location of the reservoirs.  These two large dams are also 
responsible for the ineffectiveness (in terms of sediment reduction at the overall outlet, 9) 
of converting the middle section of the watershed into conservation tillage.  The 
watershed is effectively split into 3.  This illustrates some of the problems an effective 
targeting policy has to solve.  If a whole watershed is targeted and the only monitoring 
data is available at the overall outlet, the presence of dams will mask the upstream 
situation.  More data would be needed to gather information on the whole watershed, and 
data is very costly to obtain, and relatively lengthy time series are necessary.  Targeting 
very small watersheds will likely not solve the problem, since there is no monitoring 
information for most of them.  The lack of monitoring information means there is no 
benchmark to compare the policy impacts with.  Note that a relatively long time series 
would be needed to adequately assess long-term water quality. 
 
   14 
 




Table 5 shows that the most cost effective policy in terms of sediment reduction 
where the reduction is likely to be measured would be to implement conservation tillage 
downstream.  Clearly, this policy would not be the most beneficial across the watershed.  
This raises the question of what the aim of the targeting is.  If local water quality is the 
concern, the fact that this watershed is effectively split into three parts would require to 
target all of them.  If the concern is regional water quality, or, say, the Gulf of Mexico, 
then focusing on the downstream portion of the watershed may be optimal.  In the case of 
a water quality index comprising several pollutants, determining the optimal policy may 
be harder, since some pollutants have a local nature (phosphorus and partly sediment) 
while others are a concern for estuaries and sea water (nitrates).  This also illustrates the 
usefulness of ex ante policy scenarios.  Simulations are a faster and flexible tool in 
evaluating policy, and they can be very useful in complementing measured data.   
The second scenario assumes funds are targeted to the sub-watersheds with the 
highest initial sediment loads.  Since the watersheds have different size, we look at 
sediment per hectare.  Such a focus would be closer in spirit to emission-based pollution 
control.   15 
 Table 6 shows that targeting the worst watersheds in terms highest loads per 
hectares would focus the policy to the upstream portion of the watershed.  Again, this 
would imply that there is no water quality improvement at the main outlet.  This clearly 
illustrates the ineffectiveness of using emissions as the basis for policy if the concern is 
the overall outlet.  
 
Table 6 - Target on the basis of the highest load 
 
Reach  Sediment Transport to Main 
Channel (metric tons/ha) 
1  51.39 
2  52.61 
3  57.78 
4  48.83 
5  47.89 
6  46.67 
7  41.72 
8  44.89 
9  48.06 
 
The final policy we consider is several levels of untargeted payments.  Table 7 
shows that even the lowest per acre payment, $10, would substantially increase the level 
of adoption of conservation tillage.  It is interesting to note that the total costs of all these 
policies, even the $30/acre payment, are lower than most of the costs of complete 
conversion.  This is likely due to the high marginal costs of converting some land that 
would have to be paid to achieve complete conversion.  Table 8 shows that, in terms of 
the overall outlet, the marginal benefits of increasing payments from $20/acre to $30 
would be insignificant, while the costs would be substantial.  To assess the benefit per 
dollar of this policy, we calculated the sediment reduction at each outlet when the $10 
payment is offered in that watershed only.  So, to obtain the sediment reduction per dollar 
at reach 4, we simulate what would happen if the $10 payment were to be offered only to 
farmers in subbasin 4, and divide it to the cost of the subsidy ($10 % the number of acres 
enrolled).  This measure is the relevant one if the basis for targeting is the benefit per 
dollar at each outlet.     16 
Table 7 - Untargeted payments – CT adoption levels 
Reach  BL  $10   $20   $30  
1  38.33  46.45  59.12  65.48 
2  41.88  59.14  73.76  76.83 
3  43.39  58.97  72.08  79.76 
4  58.49  66.14  77.03  85.00 
5  43.33  52.19  73.91  79.33 
6  47.64  59.20  68.97  77.94 
7  39.07  58.68  65.17  77.34 
8  49.80  58.07  66.43  73.65 
9  41.50  62.17  69.86  77.46 
         
CT adoption whole 
watershed 
46.00  58.25  69.85  77.36 
         
Total cost  $ 0 $4,023,120 $14,895,010$26,380,430 
 
Table 8 - Untargeted payments - sediment (metric tons/year) 
   BL  $10  $20  $30 
Reach  Sediment Sediment Sediment Sediment
1  195,358 184,689 167,315 166,045
2  590,683 540,861 476,937 459,945
3  545,711 541,894 453,100 453,444
4  2,200,478 2,056,656 1,824,817 1,751,672
5  311,848 277,502 225,779 221,182
6  873,144 819,644 772,800 735,589
7  997,356 845,106 830,739 738,350
8  3,678,722 3,612,944 3,391,667 3,269,550
   
Total cost  $ 0 $4,023,120 $14,895,010 $26,380,430 
 
Table 9 shows that the highest benefit per dollar would be obtained at the 
subbasin 9.  The range of values is quite large, indicating that there is ample room for 
inefficiency.  Because of the hydrology of this watershed, the highest benefit per dollar as 
measured at the outlet 9 would also be obtained by offering the $10 payment to farmers 
in subbasin 9. 
   17 
Table 9 – Benefit per dollar in sediment reduction (metric tons/year) for a $10 subsidy 
Reach  benefit per dollar 
 
1  0.04 
2  0.08 
3  0.01 
4  0.20 
5  0.10 
6  0.07 
7  0.31 
8  0.03 





The empirical analysis of one pollutant in one watershed illustrates the complexity of 
watershed conservation policy and targeting.  In general, it is evident that “targeting” is 
too vague to be an operative concept.  It is necessary to identify at least two aspects: The 
first is the spatial dimension.  The determination of where the objective of the policy is to 
be measured is crucial in determining which areas are the optimal ones to target.  The 
second factor to be considered is the objective of targeting, be it an initial pollutant load, 
in absolute terms or per acre, the potential pollutant reduction or the potential benefit per 
dollar.  Simultaneously targeting several pollutants would be even more complex, 
because, as we mentioned before, they might be relevant at different spatial scales, and 
the creation of an index would be necessary.  However, conservation policies for 
agriculture have started to shift their focus from income support to being result-oriented.  
This is partly because the Clean Water Act was effective in curbing pollution from point 
sources but did not tackle non point sources, and agriculture in particular.  Today, water 
quality problems are mostly due to non-point sources.  The high number of impaired 
waters, and the elevated levels of impairment are pushing towards a more performance-
based conservation policy.  This will require adequate information on the magnitude of 
the problem, and reasonable assessments of the efficacy and costs of the various policies 
available.   18 
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